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Nigeria returned to a democratic government in 1999. Evidence in the literature shows that democracy promotes 
economic development. In the recent past, the democratic trajectory of Nigeria has led to empirical debates about 
the democratization process of the developing states in particular, which is prone to multifaceted challenges. 
This study examines the impact of democratic government on Nigerian economic development using the VAR 
autoregressive approach. Our empirical work suggests that democracy has a long-run relationship with the 
economic development of Nigeria. Against our a priori expectations and established positions in some segments 
of the literature, this study identifies a negative impact of democracy on the economic development of Nigeria 
within our study period. On the other hand, the quality of the rule of law positively impacts economic 
development in Nigeria. Furthermore, the study finds a positive impact of corruption control in Nigeria with 
economic development, although observable evidence shows that the Nigerian government’s anti-corruption 
institution is weak. This research paper recommends institutional reforms for the democratization process of 
Nigeria to fully harness one of the most significant dividends of democracy-economic development. 
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1. Introduction  
The presumption that democratic government better redistributes national income among the population has 
become one of the leading discussions among economic theorists, political thinkers, and perhaps the laymen in 
the 21st century. Democracy has its origins in the western culture of governance, and democratic states are 
arguably the most exportable government systems in the modern world to the other parts of the world. Although 
democracy probably has shortcomings, the likelihood exists that an average form of democratic government is 
better than an autocratic regime. However, the democratic credentials of many of the developing countries that 
have recently embraced democracy after some prolonged periods of military dictatorship have come under 
empirical scrutiny in the literature. The investigation of such democratic institutions arose given the perceived 
differences in the operations and implementations of the developing states' democratisation process and the first 
world countries. The Nigerian economy is one of the reference points.  
Some known dividends of democracy are the rule of law, promotion of an egalitarian society, equitable 
redistribution of income, economic growth, improvement in the healthcare system, advancement in economic 
planning, and adequate welfare provision for the population through a drastic reduction in poverty rates. By 
extension, evidence exists in the literature that democracy promotes economic development (Acemoglu et al. 
2019; Lake and Baum, 2001; Olson, 1993; Pel, 1999; Ross, 2001, 2006). A critical observation of the Nigerian 
economy shows that many of the above-listed democratic ideals might not have been realized, or perhaps fully 
realized, within the last two decades. If so, does democracy offer the required solution to socio-economic 
challenges in a country like Nigeria? One of the political assumptions in Nigeria within the last decade is 
people's tendency to equate Nigeria's democratic experience as parallel to the military regime. The justification 
for such an assumption is based on the probable near- absence of Nigeria’s basic dividend of democracy. 
Further, there appears to be a growing frustration of the Nigerian population about the uncertain future of 
democracy. For instance, Nigeria is one of the poorest countries in the world. The unemployment rate in Nigeria 
has continued to grow. Despite Nigeria being a democratic state, the economic policy direction of Nigeria's state 
has remained a blur, and decaying infrastructure—detrimental to productivity, has continued to expand. The 
aggregate of these challenges listed above has led to the population’s mistrust in the democratisation process. 
Given such a contradiction, it has become imperative to examine the intersection between democracy and 
economic development in Nigeria. Because of the assumption that democratic states better provide rapid welfare 
and economic growth for the population, unlike the military regime, some scholars have conducted scholarly 
works on the impacts of democracy in Nigeria, immediately after Nigeria returned to a democratic government 
in 1999 like Jamo (2009, 2013), Ajayi, and Ojo (2014). We observe that such a hasty or short-run empirical 
investigation of democracy and economic growth in Nigeria could be flawed, given the likelihood that the 
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implications of democratic government in Nigeria might not be instantaneous. Evidence in the literature shows 
that the scholarly work of Awojobi et al. (2014) is the only known empirical essay on the long-run impact of 
democracy and economic development in Nigeria to the best of our knowledge. However, the conclusions in 
Awojobi et al. (2014) are defective from a methodological standpoint. They did not carry out any empirical 
econometric work to strengthen their observations and findings of democracy and economic development. 
Substantial evidence in the literature shows that measuring democracy in a quantifiable way is crucial to drawing 
valid inferences. Several metrics of democracy exist in the literature. Our study overcomes that shortcoming by 
introducing quantitative democracy measurements to validate our results and findings on the impact of 
democracy on economic development. 
As a follow-up to this, economic literature underscored that the time lag between policy formulation, policy 
implementation, and policy effects is critical in drawing valid conclusions about the observed effects of one 
variable on the other. Interestingly, 2019 marked twenty years of a democratic government in Nigeria, in the 
short-run and perhaps long-run context. We observe that the timing is right for determining the impacts of 
democratic government on Nigeria's economic development. That is the key motivation for this study: to unravel 
the effects of democracy on economic development in Nigeria after twenty years of uninterrupted democracy—a 
first in Nigerian history. Therefore, this study's novelty concerns an assessment of the implications of democracy 
on Nigeria’s economic development with time-series data within the first twenty years of Nigeria’s sustained 
democratic experience. 
In our view, twenty years is sufficient for the partial and perhaps full manifestation of the implications of 
Nigeria’s democracy. Given this context, this study also contributes to the literature by focusing entirely on 
applying relevant democratic variables that can represent the nexus between democracy and economic 
development. Specifically, we apply proxy variables for democracy measurement, the rule of law, government 
regulations, and corruption control. Unlike the earlier scanty studies on Nigeria’s democracy and economic 
development, this is a significant attempt to quantify the democratic process in a country like Nigeria with time-
series data. That represents another contribution to the body of existing literature. 
We arrange the rest of the study as follows: Section 2 examines the contextual definitions of democracy; 
Section 3 explores economic development in perspective, Section 4 reviews the related literature, Section 5 
demonstrates measurement of democracy, Section 6 deals with data analysis, Section 7 analyses the research 
methodology, Section 8 comprises research method, Section 9 contains the estimation technique procedure, 
Section 10 shows the discussion of our result , the diagnostic tests and the Granger causality test . Section 11 
shows the impulse response function (IRF) in a chart, and Section 12 concludes the study. 
 
2. Definition of democracy 
The concept of democracy historically emerged from two Greek words: demos, meaning people, and Kratos, 
implying rule. Schumpeter (1942: 250) contends that democracy ‘…. is the institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive 
struggle for the people's vote’. For Dahl (1982:11), democracy is ‘a system of elected representative government 
operated under the rule of law, where the most significant groups in the population participate in the political 
process and have access to effective representation in the practice of making governmental decisions, that is, of 
allocation of scarce resources.  
Given the assumption in the literature that America is arguably the bastion or model of democracy globally, 
Abraham Lincoln, the United States’ ex-President, defined democracy in 1863 as ‘the government of the people, 
by the people and for the people’. All of the above definitions of democracy possibly represent the conceptual 
meaning of democracy. The principal deduction from these definitions and others not listed here, is that 
democracy is a government system with popular participation of the people to elect representatives who govern, 
serve the population interest, and provide the states with life’s necessities. By implication, democracy connotes 
the competition for power in a free and fair election devoid of intimidation, with the elected public office holders 
being accountable to the electorates. 
 
3. Economic Development in Perspective 
The concept of economic development is one of the most widely used terms in economic literature. However, 
some form of inconsistency exists concerning the meaning of economic development. Economic development is 
sometimes confused with economic growth, but the two terms are distinct, though inter-related. Contextually, to 
explain economic development, there is a need to understand economic growth. Previously, prominent 
development theorists like Todaro and Smith (2012), and Rostow (1960) in his exposition about the stages of 
economic growth theorised on the concept of economic development. Economic growth is an increase or positive 
change in output growth in an economy over some period. By the rise in output, we imply an increase in the 
GDP growth rate. In assessing the output growth, the focus is usually on the per capita output, which denotes the 
economy's production per head. This per head measurement in an economy shows the economy's health and 
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individual wellbeing. Economic development, however, extends beyond economic growth.  
Put differently, economic growth appears to be a precondition for economic development. However, 
economic development involves positive changes in the economic configuration. Economic development is 
technical knowledge acquisition. It connotes the promotion of intellectual capital, infrastructural development, 
egalitarian society, and the development of strong institutions. Alain and Elizabeth (2016:31) contend that 
'Development is about the enhancement of human wellbeing…...'. By implication, economic development is 
about human welfare advancement and creating policies that make people 'do more, live longer, and have 
happiness in abundance’. Against this backdrop, international agencies, like the U.N., the World Bank, IMF, and 
others, have focused more on global development. For instance, in 2000, the U.N. developed Millennium 
Development Goals, seven capstones of international economic development with a target date of 2015. On the 
part of the World Bank, several indicators exist to determine development as famously called World Bank 
Development Indicators. In summary, development is an all-encompassing concept which must be considered 
from a holistic perspective instead of the narrow view of economic growth. 
 
4. The Related Literature 
Substantial evidence in the literature demonstrates that on average democracy is the most appealing government 
system for the widespread participation of the citizen in public office holders’ determination and ability to spur 
economic development (Pel,1999; Somolakae,2007). Over the years, non-democratic states primarily in Sub-
Saharan Africa have observed in amazement the sustained economic development in many of the western 
democratic countries of the U.S, the UK, Germany, Netherlands, France, and others. The pressure to emulate the 
development strides in the above-listed countries is one of the primary reasons for many developing countries, 
including Nigeria, returning to democratic government in 1999 (Omotola,2007). However, Nigeria's 
democratisation process has opened another dimension into the trajectory of democracy in modern times. In 
Nigeria's context, there are growing assertions that Nigeria’s democratic government has not been entirely 
responsible for the people’s needs and that Nigeria’s democratic process, especially the electioneering process, is 
afflicted with myriads of avoidable drawbacks. 
The consensus about democracy and economic development in Africa is a blur. Some political thinkers like 
Sirowy and Inkels (1991), Bardhan (2002), Prezworski and Lamongi (1993) have probably argued that the 
relationship between democracy and economic development is negative. Such a view might appear controversial. 
However, a critical observation of Nigeria's political space revealed two categories of people, the elites and the 
citizens, as argued by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006:15). They contend in their book titled 'Economic Origins 
of Dictatorship and Democracy' that elites in the developing states with the democratic government have an 
enormous influence on the political process against the citizens, potentially breeding inequalities. Practically 
speaking, in Nigeria, political power through the democratic process rests in the hands of these elites, in contrast 
to the ethos of democracy in western democracies. That has created many overnight super-wealthy men who 
control political power over the entire population, given their access to state power. Alapiki (2004:56) opined 
that ‘the wealthiest people in Nigeria are those who have access to state power through political corruption, 
access to unmerited states contracts, tax waivers, and concessions via import licenses. One harmful effect of 
such practice is the drain on government revenue. Further, the wealth of the super-rich and politically exposed 
people sometimes determines the fate of Nigeria's democratic process by the sponsorship of candidates for 
public office(s) to maintain status-quo. Such conduct potentially leads to political brigandage and mob actions 
that preclude the rightful candidates from participating in the democratic process, as Gilbert (2003:55) posited. 
The aggregate of these factors becomes an impediment to Nigeria’s democratic growth. 
Given the above, it becomes imperative to determine the implications of democracy on economic 
development. Democracy is a controversial term in the context of applications. Some scholars have divided 
democracy into two parts: the western-style democracy and the democracy of the developing states. For instance, 
the western-style democracy features prominently in the U.S., the UK, Canada, Germany, France, and most 
advanced countries. However, virtually all the democracies in developing countries, except for a few, follow the 
second version of democracy riddled with flaws. 
Within the last two decades of democracy in Nigeria, several debates have come up in the literature 
regarding the impact of democratic government on economic development. Using some metrics of growth and 
economic development as sourced from various agencies, the Nigerian states have not realised the positive 
effects of democracy. For the poverty rate as a measure of welfare, the rate has been increasing. The prevalence 
of corruption in Nigeria is still high. The inability of Nigeria’s democratic government to find a lasting solution 
to the insecurity problem ravaging the country’s North-East, particularly, has driven out some investors from 
Nigeria who consider the environment as not too secure for investment. The cumulative effect of the above 
issues has led to sustained agitations for resource control, restructuring the country into regions, and rising ethnic 
agitations from various groups like IPOB-Indigenous People of Biafra in the South-east, Oduduwa republic 
agitators in the South-west, and Middle belt consultative forum among others. The standard position about the 
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demands of the ethnic champions is that democracy in Nigeria has promoted the elites' interest over the 
population, leading to a class struggle for the perceived domination of one ethnic group in the power play of 
Nigeria above others. 
From the preceding, it becomes crucial to determine the implications of democracy on Nigeria's economic 
development within the first two decades of its sustenance. Relatively few scholars have written in the past 
concerning the effects of democracy on Nigeria's economic development, especially at its onset (Awojobi et al., 
2014; Jamo, 2010). We conceived the idea of this study long ago. However, before starting work on the study, 
we deliberately took time for the short-run and the long-term impacts of democracy in Nigeria to emerge. In this 
way, this study represents the first attempt to determine the relationship between democracy and economic 
development in Nigeria within the first twenty years of uninterrupted democracy. Nigeria has never had such a 
long period of democracy. The military halted Nigeria's first democratic experience, lasting six years during the 
first republic. The second republic lasted about five years before the military took the reign of governance. The 
third republic was aborted mid-way in 1993. Therefore, this study is strategic on many fronts and timely because 
some political thinkers have argued that democracy is a process and that after twenty years, its manifestation 
ought to show. We concur with that line of thought—leading us into the measurement of democracy as crafted 
below. 
 
5. Measurement of Democracy 
Literature reveals that scholars have attempted to measure democracy. Within the confine of political research on 
the Nigerian economy, studies like Ajayi and Ojo (2014), Ardo (2000), and Jamo (2010) did not utilise a widely 
accepted metric to measure democracy in their various studies on democracy and economic development in 
Nigeria. In this study, we presume that to draw a valid inference in an empirical work about democracy, we 
should utilise a widely acceptable indicator(s) of democracy. Our crucial measures of democracy in this study 
are the Polity IV index (2020) of the regime characteristics ranging from 0 to 100 or -10 to +10, and the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators by Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay (2020). The advantages of the two 
sources of democracy metrics in this study include:  
[a] Evidence abounds in the literature that democracy, as practised in the developed economies, differs from 
the democratic procedures of developing countries like Nigeria. Such disparity in democratisation has led to two 
dichotomies of democracy in the literature; first, the western model of democracy otherwise known as the ideal 
form of democracy which promotes economic development in first world countries. However, many developing 
countries like Nigeria, Togo, Angola, and Venezuela, practice pseudo-democracy—probably defective in its 
implementation and approach. In this sense, democracy is likely not to have uniform effects across all the 
countries, or perhaps in all the newly democratise developing countries. As such, the measurement of democracy 
should reflect both the ideal form of democracy and the pseudo-democracy. The Polity IV index of democracy 
and the Worldwide Governance Indicators significantly demonstrate countries' transition process from pseudo-
democracy to ideal democracy. Both metrics are in the range of numbers indicating the probability of coverage 
of all the democratisation processes in most states. For instance, for the Polity IV index of regime characteristics 
(2020), 100 or +10 represents full democracy, whilst 0 or -10 implies an autocratic regime. Still, the various 
governance system exists between the lower bound of 0 and higher bound of 100. For the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, it ranges from -2.5 as the lower bound to +2.5 as the higher bound reflecting varying 
government degrees. Scholars have used these indicators as exemplified in Barro (1998). Interestingly, we can 
explore the trajectory of democracy in Nigeria within the last two decades in the two-democracy metrics context.  
[b] For the political literature assumption that the control of corruption under the democratic government is 
better than the military regime given the accountability of a democratic government to the population, there is a 
need to search for a variable to denote corruption control under the democratic government. In a sense, 
corruption control is controversial because of the concept's subjectivity and the perceived shortcomings 
associated with its measurement. Empirical evidence suggests that many of the metrics of corruption are poorly 
and controversially measured. Nonetheless, the consensus in the literature is that corruption impedes economic 
development. In Nigeria’s context, the corruption problem is one of the significant impediments to economic 
development. The recognition of this challenge is traceable to establishing the two domestic anti-corruption 
agencies in Nigeria, notably, the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) in 1999 and the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission in 2000. One widely acceptable measurement of corruption is the 
perception index of corruption from Transparency International. In Nigeria's context, there is an allegation of 
bias about the country’s ranking by Transparency International. Therefore, drawing from the literature’s 
evidence, we augment the application of variables for democracy in this study with quality of corruption control 
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, free from the subjective opinion of Nigerians about its corruption 
index. The Worldwide Governance Indicators are a unique project on governance partly funded by the World 
Bank. Such a metric of corruption control is justified as a measurement of the democratic process in Nigeria. 
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6. Data Analysis 
To assess the impact of democracy on economic development in Nigeria, this study applies annual time-series 
data for 20 years of sustained democratic government in Nigeria between 1999 and 2019. We utilize the per 
capita real GDP growth rate sourced from World Development Indicators (2020) to proxy economic 
development. We apply three democracy indicators: Polity IV index of democracy from the Freedom House 
(2020), we source for quality of government regulations, the rule of law index, and quality of corruption control 
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2020). 
 
7. Methodology and Estimation Techniques 
In this part of the study, we develop a model of economic development for Nigeria. We aim to determine if 
democracy has driven Nigeria's economic development within the past twenty years of sustained democratic 
government. This study follows the strand of the political economy literature of Acemoglu et al. (2019) and 
Garring et al. (2005:323) seeking to link economic growth and development with the democratisation process of 
economies. Also, our discussion of the linkage between democracy and economic development is timely, given 
that twenty years is good enough for perceived long-run implications of democracy on economic development to 
begin to emerge. We estimate the following regression equation:  
!̇= "+ #′$%+ &…………………………………………. (1)  
In equation 1 above, ! ̇ is the proxy variable for the annual rate of economic development in Nigeria. The 
intercept is " and our #′ captures the vector of variables that affect economic development in Nigeria, whilst & is 
the error term. The choice of explanatory variables for our model equation, as specified below, follows the 
assumptions about economic development in Acemoglu et al. (2005, 2019), Barro (1998), Gerring et al. (2005), 
Przewprski and Lamongi (2007), Sirowy and Linkels (1991) and others about the formulation of a model of 
economic development with the democratic process. The specific model for this study is given as:  
PGDP= f (DEMO, REGO, QCOR) ……………………………………………. (2)  
PGDP is the per capita real GDP growth rate of Nigeria that proxy Nigeria's economic development 
between 1999 and 2019. DEMO is the democracy metric for Nigeria, denoting the democratic governance 
ranking in Nigeria within our study period. REGO is a composite variable derived from the interaction of 
government regulations and the rule of law in Nigeria to proxy the institutionalised democratic rule of law in the 
country. QCOR is the quality of corruption control in Nigeria within the period of our study. The functional form 
of our econometric model is in level-level:  
'()'* = 0 + #1 )+,-* + #2 .+(-* + #3 /0-.* + & ….………………...(3)  
We briefly justify the inclusion and utilization of our explanatory variables below: There are variants of 
democracy indicators and measurements from various sources like the Polity IV index, Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, and the CESifo group, among others. In this study, we utilize the democracy metrics from the Polity 
IV index of regime characteristics given its advantage over some other democracy qualities. The trajectory of the 
Nigerian political space revolves around periods of military rule and democratic government. Therefore, the 
measurement indicators for Nigerian democracy should explore the trends in the transition from military to 
pseudo-democracy and democracy. Further, arguments have been put forward that the Nigerian version of 
democracy is still in infancy, given its associated challenges. Therefore, the Polity IV index of democracy, 
ranging from -10 to +10 or 0 to 100 points representing a varying degree of democratic governance, better serves 
our purpose of measurement of Nigeria's democracy. One of the known characteristics of a democratic 
government is the enshrinement of the rule of law's principle. Some scholars have argued that the primary 
difference between an autocratic regime and a democratic government is the absence of the rule of law under an 
authoritarian regime. We introduce a composite explanatory variable to determine the impact of the rule of law 
in Nigeria's democratic government in the model. Corruption is one of the many challenges confronting 
economic development in Nigeria. Nigeria and the international community assumed that once democracy was 
established in 1999, the country’s corruption problem would be better addressed under a democratic government. 
Given that position, we introduce an explanatory variable for Nigeria's corruption control under the democratic 
government. 
 
8. Research Method 
In this study, we apply an econometric method of the Johannsen Cointegration VAR model developed by 
Johansen (1988) and Juselius (1990, 1992). One advantage of the vector autoregressive model is that it permits 
each of the variables in the equation's system to explain its effect on itself. Further, the system variables explain 
corresponding impacts on the other variable in the regression equation without imposing a theoretical structure 
on the estimates. It also permits the application of forecast experiments with the IRF or the variance 
decomposition. The primary interest of the study is to determine the impacts of democracy on economic 
development. Therefore, we use three explanatory variables to denote democracy metrics, as illustrated in 
equation (3). 
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9. Estimation Procedure 
This study’s estimation procedure begins with determining an optimal lag structure, as shown in Table 7 (See 
appendices), indicating the two lag structures use. The next important task is to perform the unit root test on the 
time-series macro-variables in our model. The unit root test is useful for determining the stationary of our 
variables, by implication to determine if our variables show some features like mean reversion and finite 
variance (Babatunde and Adefabi, 2005). We use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test to determine our 
variables' stationary conditions. For variables to be worthy of the VAR autoregressive method, they must not be 
stationary at level. However, when converted into the first difference, it must be stationary: integration of order 
one -I (1).  
In the next order, we perform the Johansen cointegration test to determine if there is a long-run association 
among the variables. If the outcome of the Cointegration test indicates a long-run association among the 
variables, we perform the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM); otherwise, we follow the Vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model's path or SVAR. Our cointegration test performed for model variables specified 
above indicates the existence of a long-run association among our variables of interest: PGDP, DEMO, REGO, 
and QCOR. To determine our variable's response to each of the impulse variables, we carried out the IRF, the 
output of which is presented in Figure 1. 
 
10. Empirical Analysis and Discussion of Results 
10.1 Stationary Test 
We use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) approach to determine our variables' order of integration level. 
Table 1 below presents the outcome of the unit root tests with the ADF. Table 1 illustrates the dynamics of the 
variables in their levels and first difference form. The null hypothesis for the ADF at a 5% level of significance 
is that our variable has a unit root or not stationary. The alternative hypothesis is that our variable does not have 
a unit root or is stationary. 
Table 1:   Unit Root Tests for Stationarity with Augmented Dickey-Fuller in levels and first difference 
Series Augmented Dickey-Fuller at Level     Augmented Dickey-Fuller at first difference 
Test Statistics 5% Critical Value Outcome Test Statistics 5% Critical Value Outcome 
PGDP -2.530958 -3.020686 I(0) -6.618872 -3.052169 I(1) 
DEMO -0.781283 -3.020686 I(0) -4.812757 -3.029970 I(1) 
REGO -2.110910 -3.052169 I(0) -3.892375 -3.065585 I(1) 
QCOR -2.450483 -3.052169 I(0) -3.729322 -3.065585 I(1) 
Source: Author’s Computations using Eviews 10. 
From Table 1 above, all our variables: PGDP, DEMO, QCOR, and REGO have a unit root, by implication 
they are not stationary at the level since each of the respective tests statistics values for all the variables are less 
than the critical values. However, in the conversion to the first difference, each of the test statistics, as indicated 
in Table 1, is greater than the critical values, indicating integration of order one, I (1). From the analysis of the 
stationary test above, we can conclude that our variables of interest have a unit root, therefore, we undertake the 
cointegration test. 
 
10.2 Cointegration Test 
Table 2 below presents the results of the Johansen cointegration test for this study. The decision rule is that if the 
trace statistics value is greater than the 5% critical value, we can conclude that there is cointegration among the 
tested variables; otherwise, we conclude that there is no cointegration among the variables.  
Table 2: Johansen Co-integration Test Result Showing Number of Cointegrating Vectors 









None* 0.940044 66.33206 47.85613 0.004 Cointegrating 
At most 1 0.570580 21.30563 29.79707 0.3389 Not 
Cointegrating 
At most 2 0.324387 7.780532 15.49471 0.4892 Not 
Cointegrating 
At most 3 0.089852 1.506371 3.841466 0.2197 Not 
Cointegrating 
Source: Author’s Computation using Eviews 10. 
The trace statistics of 66.33206, as shown in Table 2 above, are greater than the critical 5% value of 
47.85613. Therefore, we can conclude that there is one cointegration among the variables being tested. This 
outcome's interpretation is that there is a long-run relationship among PGDP, DEMO, QCOR, and REGO. More 
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specifically, assumptions hold that all our four variables are not likely to move far apart in the long-run. With the 
outcome of the Johansen cointegration test, we can perform VECM since there is evidence of a long-run 
relationship among our variables of interest. 
 
10.3 Vector Error Correction Model Output 
We illustrate the output of our VECM in Tables 3 and 4. The first table shows the Johansen normalisation 
cointegration vector. Interpretatively, it represents the long-run equilibrium solution of our regression equation 
model. In Table 4, the vector error correction estimates, which is the short-run -OLS regression estimates for our 
model.  
Table 3: Johansen Normalization Cointegration Vector or Long Run Equilibrium Solution 
 Co-integration Equation Long Run Solution 








Note: t statistics in parenthesis. The signs of the coefficients would become opposite in the long -run 
interpretation. 
= [1  -6.69049  -7.005771 ] 
Source: Author’s Computation using Stata/ I/C 15.1. 
From Table 3 above - the Johansen Normalization Cointegration, we can observe a long-run positive 
relationship among the quality of regulation and the rule of law, control of corruption, and economic 
development in Nigeria. However, contrary to our prior expectation, there is a negative long-run relationship 
between democracy and economic development in Nigeria. The estimated coefficients are significant at the 5% 
level. This finding aligns with the conclusions of scholars like Bardhan (2002), Gerring et al. (2005), Sirowy and 
Linkels (1991), and Przeworski and Lamongi (2007) about the potential inverse relationship between democracy 
and economic growth. Fundamentally speaking, Nigeria's democratic operations since 1999 have continued to 
evoke stringent investigations about the lack of clarity of direction, non or low existent of the dividend of 
democracy, electoral malpractices, voter's apathy; the combination of those factors has led to weak democratic 
institutions. Therefore, our finding of an inverse association between democracy and economic development in 
Nigeria is plausible. Given the divergent position between the western-style democracy and the developing 
state's model of democracy, the democratic experience of the Nigerian state appears to be parallel to the ideals of 
democracy as enshrined in the political economy literature. 
Table 4:        Vector Error Correction (VEC) Estimates: Number of Coefficients-N=16. 

















































R-Squared 0.4058 0.6170 0.1759 0.2427 
F Statistics 0.6830471 16.11081 2.134945 3.204974 
Likelihood 0.3368 0.0132 0.9069 0.7827 
∆ = -0.077 -  0.125∆ +  0.019∆   +  2.886∆  – 1.143∆  – 0.234  
Note: t- statistics in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s Computation using Stata / I/C 15.1. 
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Democracy indicator, as seen in Table 4, illustrates an adverse and statistically insignificant effect of -1.143 
in the estimated economic development proxy equation. Interpretatively, one lag period of democracy in Nigeria 
has a negative but insignificant effect on Nigeria's economic development. Democracy, as practised in Nigeria, 
has come under empirical attacks given that it probably negates the acceptable standard of democratic 
governance. The possible violation of the rule of law appears to be present in the Nigerian polity. For example, 
the allegation of killings of the #ENDSARS protesters in Lekki, Lagos Nigeria in 2020 has led to international 
condemnation of the Nigerian government for the invitation of the military to quell an organised protest by 
unarmed youths demonstrating against police brutalities and misgovernance in Nigeria.  
Furthermore, the Nigerian government has taken steps in recent times to curtail freedom of speech through 
the hate speech penal code or law and other non-democratic actions. The electoral process in Nigeria is prone to 
challenges like most developing states across the world. The likely skew electoral process probably facilitates 
the wrong candidates to get into elective positions and serve some vested interest. The political office holders in 
Nigeria perhaps assume that holding public offices is an automatic avenue to become wealthy. The cost of 
governance in Nigeria is also another impediment to the realisation of the dividend of democracy. In the word of 
Alapiki (2004), the wealthiest people in Nigeria are those who have access to political or public offices. The 
weak political institutions in Nigeria, as pointed out by Acemoglu et al. (2012), have further complicated the 
democratisation trajectory of Nigeria. From all of the listed conditions, the likelihood exists that democracy has 
not contributed meaningfully to the Nigerian economic development between 1999 and 2019. However, 
democracy, if well managed, can promote economic development like the world’s advanced economies.  
Table 4 shows that the adjustment term (-0.234) shows no evidence of statistical significance at a 5% level 
of significance, suggesting that the previous year's errors or perhaps the deviation from the long-run equilibrium 
are not corrected for within the current year at a convergence speed of 0.234 percentage point. For the quality of 
regulation and the rule of law, we found evidence of statistically significant yearly adjustment, as illustrated in 
Table 4, with an estimated 0.207*.  
The quality of regulations and the rule of law in Nigeria had a direct but statistically insignificant effect of 
0.019 in the estimated economic development proxy regression equation. Specifically, the one-period lag of 
quality of regulations and the rule of law in Nigeria, although positive, does not have a significant implication on 
the Nigerian economic development within our study period.  
The control of corruption in Nigeria exact positive but a statistically insignificant effect of 2.886 in the 
estimated economic development proxy regression equation in Table 4. One lag period of control of corruption 
in Nigeria does not have a significant impact on economic development. The deduction from this finding is that 
the fight against corruption in Nigeria is plausible, given that corruption impedes economic growth. However, 
the outcome of such a corruption fight since 1999 in Nigeria, as observed from our finding, is statistically 
insignificant. Evidence in Nigeria shows that the agencies responsible for the fight against corruption are 
sometimes enmeshed in corruption. For instance, the substantive chairman of the Economic and Financial Crime 
Commission in Nigeria (EFCC), Mr. Ibrahim Magu was suspended by the President in 2020 primarily for 
corruption allegations and was later removed from office in a controversial manner. Such development 
sometimes cast aspersions on the activities of the anti-corruption watchdog. 
Besides, there are allegations in Nigeria that the ruling party probably manipulate the anti-corruption 
agencies to settle political scores, especially with opposition. The aggregate of all of these factors might have 
played roles in the insignificant positive effects of corruption control on economic development in Nigeria. 
 
10.4 Diagnostic Tests 
Given our Johansen cointegration output, as discussed above, we follow up with the required diagnostic tests, 
namely the normality test and the autocorrelation test.  
Table 5: Diagnostic Tests 
Diagnostic Tests  Chi-Square Probability Value 
Jarque-Bera Normality test (ALL) 0.9775 
LM Test of Autocorrelation 
Lag 1 0.87279 
Lag 2 0.89639 
Source: Author’s Computation using Stata /IC 15.1 
From Table 5, we use the Jarque-Bera Normality test to determine if our variables' residuals have a normal 
distribution. The null hypothesis, at a 5% level of significance, is that the residuals of variables have normal 
distribution whilst the alternative says otherwise. Our probability value with Chi-square distribution is 0.9775—
clearly above the 5% level thresholds. We can safely conclude that our variables have a normal distribution. For 
an autocorrelation test, we utilise the L.M. test of autocorrelation.  
In Table 5, focusing on lag 2, we can observe that no autocorrelation's null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
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since 0.89639 is above the 5% critical value. The two diagnostics tests imply that our model is well specified, 
and by extension, the results are tenable. 
 
10.5 Granger Causality Test 
Table 6 portrays the Wald tests for our Granger causality tests. We discuss each of the outcomes of the Granger 
causality tests below.  
Table 6: Granger Causality Test Results 
Dependent Variables       Chi-Square Statistics P-Values 
 PGDP REGO QCOR DEMO Joint Causality 
PGDP     - 0.9945 0.7396 0.1754 0.5844 
REGO 0.0023*       - 0.1348 0.0030* 0.0061* 
QCOR 0.3337 0.7402      - 0.2874 0.7268 
DEMO 0.3215 0.3213 0.6433     - 0.7634 
* Denotes 5% level of significance of Chi-Square Probability Values. 
Source: Author’s Computation using Stata / I/C 15.1 
From the Granger test result, we can observe that the quality of regulation and the rule of law did not 
Granger-cause economic development in Nigeria since the probability value of 0.9945 is above the 5% critical 
value thresholds within the period of our study. The quality of corruption control did not also Granger-cause 
economic development as observe in Table 6 because the Chi-square probability value of 0.7396 is above 5% 
critical value. Last, the democracy indicator with a Chi-square probability value of 0.1754 did not Granger-cause 
economic development between 1999 and 2019. Jointly, all the democratic metrics used in Table 6 did not 
Granger-cause economic development during our study period. In a way, the Granger causality tests further 
reinforce our observations and findings with the VECM. 
 
11. Impulse Response Function 
We explain the changing properties of our VECM model with the IRF application, as captured below in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 demonstrates the response of our dependent variable, economic development proxy to various shocks. 
Using 10 years of the future forecast, we observe that the reaction of DEMO to one standard deviation shock in 
PGDP is an increasing negative sign from the first period to the tenth period, which underscores our findings of 
the negative relationship between the Nigerian democracy and economic development during our study period. 
Further, QCOR follows the same pattern with the DEMO in its impulse response. However, REGO is 
positive in the first period with an increasing positive throughout the short-run, (period 5), it slightly declines in 
period 6 but maintains a positive outlook till period 10. Our IRF implies that our two explanatory variables' 
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This study investigates the relationship between democracy and economic development in Nigeria. This study's 
crucial findings are as follows: first, evidence in the Johannsen cointegration shows a long-run equilibrium 
relationship among our variables of interest in the model. Specifically, the result of our Johansen cointegration 
indicates that Nigeria’s economic development and democracy likely move together in the long-run. However, 
the results demonstrate that democracy had a negative relationship with the Nigerian economic development 
during our study (1999 -2019), aligning with Madu et al.'s (2015) position.  
Furthermore, we found no evidence of causality between democracy and economic development during the 
same period. The applied IRF also suggests a possible negative economic development response to democracy. 
Nigeria arguably runs one of the most expensive democratic governments in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an over-
bloated wage bill for the political office holders to the detriment of the state's core developmental objectives. 
Besides, the population’s lack of trust in the democratic process has negatively contributed to the voter's apathy, 
helping the privileged few in Nigeria to perpetuate their political domination on the entire country.  
This study further identifies evidence of a long-run equilibrium relationship among the control of corruption 
variables, quality of regulations with the rule of law, and economic development. Unlike the identified 
association between democracy and economic development in Nigeria, an inverse, we observe a positive 
relationship between regulatory quality (with the rule of law) and economic development. However, we found no 
evidence of causality among the variables during our study period. In a way, the rule of law is one of the 
democratic sub-structures that societies should implement to guarantee a vital democratic institution. An 
improvement in the Nigerian government’s commitment to the fight against corruption would expand the 
country’s political space. The promotion of the rule of law is also crucial for the democratisation process.  
We identify a positive (but statistically insignificant in the short run) association between the control of 
corruption in Nigeria and economic development. Our result possibly underpins the presumption about defects in 
the anti-corruption campaign of the Nigerian government in the literature. For example, there are allegations of 
discriminatory conduct by the anti-corruption agencies of Nigeria in pursuing assignments. There are shreds of 
evidence that if the agencies are free from political interference and control, they can perform better.  
From the policy perspective, Nigeria’s democratic space should be strengthened more. Political 
participation is very crucial to the democratization process. Observable evidence suggests that very few 
percentages of Nigerians participate in the electoral process. The monetization of Nigeria's electoral system is 
probably to disadvantage many of the interested Nigerians in the democratic process. Vital political reform 
should be put in place to promote voters’ education and constitutionalism. 
Moreover, a review of the wages and emoluments of political officeholders in Nigeria is essential. The 
situation in which ex-governors are entitled to robust retirement packages in cash and kind whilst serving as 
sitting senators in the National assembly or as ministers or Heads of government agencies, and collecting salary 
and allowances for such position does not sound well for the fiscal health of the country. Such financial 
misadventure is tantamount to leakages and unjustifiable withdrawal in the economy. Perhaps, there should be an 
introduction of civic responsibilities courses in the Nigerian school system and political history pattern after the 
U.S. history and constitutionalism in the school system. Such political literacy education could advance the 
Nigerian youths' knowledge of promoting democratic government through conscious political participation. 
Substantial evidence suggests that democracy promotes development; therefore, the Nigerian state can benefit 
from the dividend of democracy with robust democratic strategies. 
Finally, for Nigeria's democratic space to develop fully, the Nigerian population should avoid anti-growth 
maladies. Such vices include ethnicity, sectionalism, and illiteracy or deliberate efforts to restrict education in 
some parts of Nigeria. To a large extent, the aggregate of these four factors is the most potent electoral 
manipulation tool of some politicians in Nigeria. As such, the Nigerian population should look beyond these 
barriers to realize democratic dividends and develop a vital democratic institution. 
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Table 7: Lag Selection Criteria Result 
                                    Criterion 
FPE AIC SC HQC 
Lag 2 2 2 2 
Source: Author’s Computation. 
FPE=Final Prediction Error 
AIC=Akaike Information Criterion 
SC=Schwartz Criterion 
HQC=Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
 
 
 
 
